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Introduction
• Background on Planetary Protection 
– Derived requirement for Thermal Protection System (TPS) reliability
– Context on TPS reliability for other human and robotic missions
• Brief Review of Mars Sample Return Studies
– Drivers for TPS reliability
– Opportunities for reliability improvement
• Emerging new TPS technologies 
– Impact on reliability
• Conclusions
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Background on Planetary Protection Requirements 
and the Grand Challenge
• NASA Policy Directive 8020.7G requires compliance with 1967 UN Treaty on Outer Space Article 
IX, which states:
• NASA Procedural Requirement 8020.12 (Planetary Protection Provisions for Robotic 
Extraterrestrial Missions) is derived from Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) Planetary 
Protection Policy
– Sample return from Mars and other water worlds: Category V “Restricted Earth Return”
• Highest degree of concern is expressed by the “absolute prohibition of destructive impact 
upon return, the need for containment throughout the return phase ….” 
– No numeric reliability allocations are provided
– Both ESA and NASA have defined design guidelines for mission studies in the recent past: 
• JPL D-31974: “probability that sample containment not assured (CNA) < 1 e-6”
• Planetary Protection for Mars Sample Return (Conley, Kminek, 2011) “Guidance: Probability of 
uncontained release of particle larger than 10 nanometers into Earth environment < 1e-6”
• Reliability allocation to subsystems is function of mission architecture
• EEV failure during correctly targeted entry < 4.0x10-7 (Gershman, 2005)
• TPS for single string EEV  < 2.5x10-7 (Preliminary PRA, Fragola 2003)
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EEV and TPS need to be extremely robust against all possible 
failure modes in the mission architecture 
Orion Post- PDR ISS Lunar
Requirement: Loss of Crew 1/290 1/200
TPS Allocation 1/5600 1/2100
4
• Waiver required for EFT-1 test flight, due to negative structural margins against cracking 
of Avcoat ablator (Vander Kam, Gage) 
• PRA estimate for structural failure due to TPS bondline overtemperature ~1/160,000 (6.25e-6)
Orion Crew Vehicle Reliability allocations
From: (AIAA 2011-422) 
• Shuttle  Analysis of data from successful flights (did not include consideration of off-nominal TPS 
states) estimated TPS reliability  0f 0.999999 ( or failure < 1.0x10-6)
– Columbia accident highlighted need for consideration of damage due to debris impact
• Robotic missions (No known mission failures due to TPS failure) (most not instrumented)
– Recession data for Galileo indicated near failure at shoulder
– MSL identified shear-induced failure mode for SLA during ground test campaign – switch to PICA
– Root cause of Mars DS2 failure unknown, but entry failure deemed unlikely
• Need comprehensive hazard analysis
• Assess likelihood and consequence for each hazard
• Need robust performance margins for all failure modes 
• Ground test to failure to establish performance limits
TPS Reliability for other NASA missions
Mars Sample Return and EEV – Past, Present and Future
• EEV design (2005) assumption that passive subsystems maximize reliability
• EEV design is monostable, chuteless and  impact  tolerant
• Carbon phenolic (CP) for the heat-shield 
– DoD flight rate success for CP use in ballistic missiles
• Micro-meteor and Orbital Debris impact – Recognized but not addressed
5
• MSR is a Campaign  (3- phase reference architecture)
– Mars 2020 (first leg is to cache sample) 
– Next two legs neither fully defined or committed by NASA
• Direct entry with EEV, or
• Integrated Human and Robotic Mars Campaign is an option
– Lunar sortie using Orion (Human assisted MSR) (Gershman, 
2015)
– Mission reliability may be improved with redundancy and 
active failure mitigation
• Other avenues - robotic sortie from earth-lunar orbit?
Figure Credit:  Scientific American 
Mission options for MSR likely applicable for Enceladus/Europa SR in the longer term.
• EEV design, once proven for MSR, will be adopted for other Sample return missions
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– Design is based on Pioneer-Venus and Galileo Probes
– Two types of CP needed for blunt body 
• Chop Molded and Tape Wrapped
• Manufacturing and failure modes are different for the two
• DoD uses only tape wrapped on slender body missiles
– Chop-molded is the weakest link
• Four Venus and 1 Galileo probes
– Flight data from Galileo 
– Not enough ground or flight data to establish reliability 
estimates
• Tape-wrap manufacturing and use for DoD
– Precursor Rayon and the processing of heritage have 
atrophied
• NASA obtained and processed the heritage rayon for MSR 
~(2003 -2006)
• Challenge is how to establish reliability for CP for MSR with 
limited quantity of carbonized rayon in hand
– Capability including failure modes vs flight environment 
MSR EEV carbon phenolic reliability argument is based on DoD’s use on ballistic missiles
P-V Probe
MMOD Risk Evaluation (2013)
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“Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Threat Assessment: Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle,” 
E. Christiansen, J. L. Hyde, M.D. Bjorkman, K. D. Hoffman, et al. NASA TM 2013-217381, 2013
• Risk from Orbital Debris alone exceeds entire TPS allocation
• MMOD “garage” on spacecraft does not adequately address 
MMOD risk
• Dedicated MMOD shield carried to Entry Interface must separate 
reliably
• TPS material that is more robust to MMOD is needed
Alternate to Garage (Corillis)
Emerging New Technologies, Materials and Capabilities
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Emerging TPS Technology Capability: 
3-D WOVEN TPS
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• 3-D Woven TPS is a family and not a single TPS.
– Automated processes – better quality control 
– weaving/resin infusion allows multi-layer and multi-
functional material development ( 3-D MAT & HEEET) 
• HEEET is targeting Venus and Saturn
– very efficient compared to CP ( ~50% of the mass)
• Acreage panels of HEEET
– very robust at extreme conditions
– no failures observed  in testing across the board
– Tested at ( 8000 W/cm2 laser testing, combined 7000 
W/cm2 and 6 atm pressure,  2000 W/cm2 and 20 atm. 
Arc jet testing) compared with MSR EEV peak 
conditions (< 2000 W/cm2 and < 0.5 atm) 
• HEEET acreage and carbon phenolics have been tested 
side-by-side at where CP exhibits spallation and other 
known failure modes
• 3-D Woven could be 
– Optimized for heatshield and backshell
– Can achieve both efficiency and robustness
– more tolerant of MMOD (not tested) due to multilayer
MMOD Tolerant Design - Emerging  Capability
- Testing and Analysis of TPS with MMOD Impact for MMOD Impact Tolerant Design
• MMOD impact tolerant design:
– Evaluate material behavior via testing  by MMOD testing followed by arc jet 
testing for hole growth 
– Shuttle Orbiter and Orion TPS followed this route 
– Physics based impact and hole growth tools have been validated with data have 
been uses to assess the MMOD risk 
– Example shown below for Carbon-Carbon
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From:  “Arcjet Testing of Micro-Meteoroid Impacted Thermal Protection Materials,”P. Agrawal, M. Munk and L.Glabb, 
AIAA Paper  2013-2903, presented at the 44th AIAA Thermosphysics Conference, June 24-27, San Diego, CA.
Emerging New Materials for  MMOD Protection 
Metallic-glasses: 
• Offer a unique combination of high-hardness, 
high-strength, low-melting temperatures (for 
shield vaporization) 
• Limited hypervelocity studies on metallic glasses 
as potential spacecraft shielding have provided 
important data about which features of these 
novel materials.  
– When tested under identical conditions with a 
baseline Whipple shield similar to what is 
currently used on the ISS, a shield with 
intermediate layers of metallic glass passed the 
test while the baseline sample did not. 
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• Iron-based bulk metallic glasses (BMG), or Amorphous steel, new materials that are under 
development are affordable to manufacture, incredibly hard, but at the same time, not brittle. 
• Work on the steel alloy, named SAM2X5-630, is the first to investigate how amorphous steels 
respond to shock
Gauri R. Khanolkar et al., “Shock Wave Response of Ironbased In Situ Metallic Glass Matrix Composites,” Scientific Report 
(http://www.nature.com/articles/srep22568) 6, article number: 22568 (2 March 2016) (doi:10.1038/srep22568)
“Hypervelocity Impact Testing of a Metallic Glass-Stuffed Whipple 
Shield,” D.C. Hofmann, L. Hamill, E. Christianson, and S, Nutt, Adv. 
Engrg. Matls. (2015) 1-10 DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/adem.201400518
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Reliability – “Devil is in the Tail” 
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Failure occurs in instances when applied load exceeds limit 
load.  This area is given by the index of reliability.
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To achieve higher reliability, increase the mean differences 
and/or decrease the variance 
• Demonstrating Reliability /Robustness is the overlap between applied load vs limit 
strength – the overlap of the tail
• In order to define the overlap of the two tails
– Challenge:  off-nominal design loads along with precursor events that lead to failure due to 
environment vs variability that lead to strength variations 
– Things such  as manufactured material property variability, performance variability (both nominal 
and off-nominal), acceptance spec and verification for variance, etc.
How do we tackle the grand challenge? (Earth Entry Vehicle DDT&E and 
Verification for Mars/Enceladus/Europa Sample Return)
From: Conley, Catharine A., and Gerhard Kminek. "Planetary Protection For Mars Sample 
Return" ESA/NASA, April 29 (2013).   Recommended Approach: 
To meet planetary protection requirements: Risk based design, accounting also for common 
cause/mode failures, drives redundancy and diversity of system design. 
– Usually not used for robotic missions to that extent but for man-rated system;
– Need to go beyond man-rated systems because consequences go beyond occupational risk potentially 
also affecting general public. 
– Fault tree needs to become the best friend of system engineer from the very begin!
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• Demonstrating Reliability /Robustness is the 
overlap between applied load vs limit 
strength – the overlap of the tail
• In order to define the overlap of the two tails
– Challenge:  off-nominal design loads along with 
precursor events that lead to failure due to environment 
vs variability that lead to strength variations 
– Things such  as manufactured material property 
variability, performance variability (both nominal and 
off-nominal), acceptance spec and verification for 
variance, etc.
Looking to the Future
• Emerging new technologies and materials combined with lessons learned from 
Orion, and progress in testing and analysis have the potential to make MSR EEV 
much more robust – until we actively pursue we will not know how robust?
• Samples Return Missions from Mars or Enceladus or Europa likely to take a decade 
and more 
– This gives time for technology development in support of EEV
– Alternate mission/campaign architecture developments
• Two areas for investigation and investment
– Emerging 3-D Woven TPS
• Promising for improved design - reliability and performance 
– Compositional simplicity, manufacturing quality control, inherent robustness
• MMOD and impact tolerance characterization 
– Could provide secondary benefits
• Failure modes and design based on robustness
– Testing and analysis aspects, developed and in use for Orion TPS.
– MMOD
• Emerging new materials need to be assessed and integrated with EEV/Mission
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Why Mars/ Enseladus/ Europa Earth Entry Vehicle is a 
grand challenge?
• Critical planetary protection task for MSR at campaign level
• Orbiter System: Potential affected sub-systems to support safety critical functions, i.e., 
verification of biological containment system, Earth divert maneuver.
• Earth Return Capsule: Potential affected sub-system are heat shield and stability during entry.
Recommended Approach: 
• Critical design approach to meet planetary protection requirements: 
– Need to go beyond man-rated systems because consequences go beyond occupational risk 
potentially also affecting general public. 
– Risk based design, accounting also for common cause/mode failures, drives redundancy and 
diversity of system design. 
• Usually not used for robotic missions to that extent but for man-rated system;
– Fault tree needs to become the best friend of system engineer from the very begin!
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From: Conley, Catharine A., and Gerhard Kminek. "Planetary Protection For Mars Sample Return" ESA/NASA, 
April 29 (2013)
Challenge: Verification of design guideline that “probability that sample containment not 
assured (CNA) < 1 e-6,” and  for TPS, single string system, “failure < 2.5 x 10-7”
